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Abstract 
Space traffic management has often, for example in the IAA Cosmic Study of 2006, been rather 
broadly defined as “the set of technical and regulatory provisions for promoting safe access into 
outer space, operations in outer space and return from space to Earth free of physical or radio-frequency 
interference.” Oftentimes, especially in space law literature, references or even comparisons have 
been made to traffic management as it has developed in aviation and (to a lesser extent) in maritime 
transport. 
However, it should be realized that space traffic management, especially under the definition 
quoted, comprises a considerably larger range of activities than air traffic management. If space traf-
fic management is ever to become feasible, therefore, rather than just referring to air and/or maritime 
traffic management, first a high-level overview should be performed of what space traffic manage-
ment effectively will comprise, what has already been taken care of and to what extent, and where 
perhaps guidance from the aviation realm may be useful after all. 
The present paper will provide such a first high-level inventory, duly taking into account the 
various special features of space activities which may provide major obstacles for any truly compre-
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of physical or radio-frequency interference.”1 Oftentimes, moreover, especially in space 
law literature, references or even comparisons have been made to traffic management as it 
has developed in aviation and (to a lesser extent) in maritime transport. 
However, if space traffic management is ever to become feasible, such comparisons 
should be scrutinized with great care. “Space traffic management” would not only encom-
pass the orderly management of (1) “piloted vessels,” which is what air traffic manage-
ment is at the heart all about, but in addition would have to deal with (2) “vessels” which 
are piloted remotely (read “unmanned spacecraft”), some of which moreover intend to 
operate in earth orbits for many years whereas others by contrast are supposed to move 
beyond earth orbit altogether, (3) “vessels”—and their component and fragmented parts—
which are no longer “piloted” in any meaningful sense (read both “small unguided satel-
lites” and “space debris”), and, following the Cosmic Study definition, as an even more 
different “item,” (4) the use of radio frequencies. Moreover, several specific aspects of 
space activities, such as the military and dual-use ones, the physical operational environ-
ment and the needs for communication, as well as the speed of movement pose additional 
problems for any truly comprehensive space traffic management regime, much more so 
than in the airspaces of this world. 
Thus, the present paper represents a first high-level framework analysis of the major 
structural aspects of that challenge—on the assumption that it would still need to be ad-
dressed in the not too distant future. 
 
2. The point of departure: “traffic management” in air law 
 
The term “traffic management,” in particular in an international context, has mainly be-
come an issue of importance in aviation and, to a considerably lesser extent (due to the 
velocity of the vessels concerned being a dimension or two smaller), in maritime 
transport. 
In international aviation, “air traffic management” (ATM) has evolved out of the more 
concise and limited notion of “air traffic control” (ATC). Whereas the latter was very much 
focused on specific (legal as well as resulting factual) control of aircraft movements to 
avoid collisions and near-collisions of aircraft for safety reasons (as well as subsidiary, se-
curity purposes of controlling entry into sovereign airspace),2 the former came to incorpo-
rate also broader aspects such as efficient and environmentally friendly use of airspace.3 
In all cases, however, the baseline category of targeted vehicles was fairly straightfor-
ward and, at a certain level of abstraction, uniform in nature: “aircraft,” meaning “any 
machine that can derive support in the atmosphere from the reactions of the air other than 
the reactions of the air against the earth’s surface”4 capable of considerable maneuvering 
even at short notice since being piloted by humans on board. Compared to the four cate-
gories which the Cosmic Study asserts should be addressed by space traffic management, 
this represents the aviation version of only the first category, that of piloted vessels. 
In addition, from a legal perspective, the authorities responsible for ATM were clearly 
demarcated by “geographical,” “spatially” defined borderlines. Every state was sovereign 
in its own national airspace, which was clearly bounded by the borders of its territory and 
territorial waters,5 and could within such sovereign airspace guarantee the implementation 
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of a coherent and comprehensive ATM system. That the vertical boundary of airspace sov-
ereignty was not in any way formally determined constituted no problem, at least from 
the perspective of air law: nobody would dispute that all aircraft addressed by ATM sys-
tems were flying in airspace as opposed to any other kind of “space,” read: outer space. 
As for the airspace above international waters, under the auspices of the International 
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) specific states were “appointed” to provide for such 
an ATM system on behalf of the international community and such a role was formally 
accepted by all other ICAO member states.6 While “geographically” speaking such inter-
national airspaces covered the greater part of the globe, in terms of actual aircraft opera-
tions they were much less relevant than the totality of sometimes heavily used national 
airspaces. International air law, including on ATM as developed under ICAO auspices, 
was thus allowed to develop almost organically from the handling of most aviation needs 
at a national level. 
In sum, for respective national airspaces each time one single national authority was 
made responsible for the management of all relevant traffic and given the competences 
and instruments to do so, whereas for the international airspaces one single intergovern-
mental organization operating under a single international conventional regime ensured 
proper arrangements of such responsibilities, competences and instruments. 
Though formally military aircraft did not fall under the rules of the Chicago Conven-
tion,7 individual states would of course in their national ATM systems take care of any 
potential interference of military aircraft with civil aviation wherever this could—occa-
sionally—be at issue, for example by the creation of special “no-fly zones” reserved for air 
force maneuvers. 
These ATM systems also generically allowed for special flights of aircraft not engaged 
in civil aviation as principally addressed by the Chicago Convention and ICAO, whether 
this concerned commercial aviation (the small business jets), amateur aviation, aviation 
sporting events, hot air balloons or even rocket launches (where the launch area would 
become a temporary no-fly zone for the duration of the launch window). This simply 
worked, principally because there was little question—or at least an underlying assump-
tion—that ATM could focus on civil aviation and handle other uses of the same three-
dimensional spaces as exceptions to the standard approaches and procedures. 
The core of the system finally consisted of two main elements: (1) awareness with a 
central entity of the positions and intended trajectories of all aircraft and occasional other 
craft—all, however, so far comprising “piloted vessels”—in a certain three-dimensional 
airspace, and (2) the competence of such an entity, following a priori rules, regulations, 
procedures, and standards, to direct specific aircraft to change position or trajectory in such 
a manner as to avoid threats to safety or security or allow for efficient use of airspace. 
While undoubtedly the example of ATM would thus be very interesting and useful in a 
number of respects when it comes to creating a space traffic management system, when 
transferring this comprehensive but straightforward and relatively monolithic system-of-
systems to outer space the above evaluation has to be borne in mind. At least three major 
issues would consequently arise here. 
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3. The awareness issue: the reality of spaceflight 
 
First, the maneuverable manned vessels which formed the core of the global ATM system 
comprise, certainly so far, a minority of all vessels moving in outer space. A system mainly 
based on communicating with pilots would consequently fall woefully short of a compre-
hensive and safe system of “awareness.” Self-reporting by automated devices would need 
to be comprehensively effectuated to establish that. 
In addition, for unmanned spacecraft any traffic management system should substitute 
such communication for awareness purposes with pilots and automated onboard systems 
with communication to the ground control systems. That should not be an insurmountable 
problem, yet it has to be taken into account—for instance, because a particular space object 
may be monitored by various ground stations spread across the globe depending upon the 
particular location at issue at any given point in time. 
For unguided small satellites and space debris, however, mostly even that approach of 
taking on board ground stations would not work—both would normally not have any au-
tomated self-reporting capability on board (anymore). Whereas for the unguided small 
satellites—hopefully—proper registration with the Registration Convention8 combined 
with the usually short duration of their presence in a limited area at the lower margins of 
outer space would be sufficient to create positional awareness of maneuverable spacecraft 
as part of a space traffic management system, it does indeed require an across-the-board 
application of the registration obligations. Currently, however, the picture in this regard is 
not very comforting; many small satellites as of yet go unregistered because of confusion 
on the applicability of the Registration Convention to “a space object [not] launched into 
Earth orbit beyond.”9 
As for space debris, however, it has already become abundantly clear that no amount 
of fully-fledged application of the Registration Convention would be able to take care of 
the extent to which a space traffic management would require relevant position and tra-
jectory information.10 While there are some “unilateral” efforts to provide the international 
community with data on identified space debris, such as the US Space Surveillance Net-
work (SSN), also these are currently far removed from the level of comprehensiveness nec-
essary for a viable and effective space traffic management system.11 
Finally, the use of radio frequencies for communication purposes has of course also been 
present in aviation almost since its inception, and through the ITU system does allow for 
at least a general level of “awareness.” 
A summary investigation of current law and key players in the realm of awareness thus 
shows the complexity of (and the loopholes within) the existing landscape. An ITU-regime 
takes care of assignment of frequencies used by satellites as well as the attendant orbital 
slots or orbits at the international level, with some national regimes implementing that 
regime for national operators—but also for exclusively national usage of frequencies and 
orbital slots/orbits. Frequencies used by space vehicles, whether sub-orbital or orbital, and 
space stations such as the ISS, also somehow fit within that system. 
The Outer Space Treaty at the same time “rules” the general behavior of states with 
respect to satellites and other space objects, notably including the notification and consul-
tation obligations under Article IX. Further to Articles VIII and IX of the Outer Space 
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Treaty, the Registration Convention provides for its own—though rather summary—sys-
tem of “awareness,” read registration of main parameters, including national registration 
as appropriate. As said, there is furthermore considerable doubt regarding its application 
to sub-orbital launches, whether manned or unmanned. 
As for “space debris,” that system is rather unsatisfactory, and awareness exclusively 
relies on a few national, unilateral surveillance systems, as indicated. 
 
4. The competence issue: the “faits accomplish” of space (law) 
 
Second, in outer space there is no system for allocating ATM-like authority along the lines 
of the Chicago Convention, individual sovereign states and the ICAO system. Unlike air 
space, outer space of course as a whole falls outside of individual states’ sovereign juris-
diction12 and thus basically equates with the (airspace above the) high seas in terms of its 
international legal status. And whereas the Chicago Convention has provided the baseline 
formula for handling ATM above the high seas under ICAO guidance further to individual 
states operating domestic ATM systems in national airspace, there is no comparable pro-
vision in the Outer Space Treaty or comparable authority resting with COPUOS to assume 
the central coordinating role of ICAO in its framework—including in the context of ITU-
related frequency management.13 
Yet, simply providing ICAO with an extension of its authority to address aircraft so as 
to encompass also spacecraft not only would require considerable expertise with space 
flight (generally available much more in specialized space agencies than at ICAO) and pro-
found adaptation of the system of the Chicago Convention (such as overhauling the cur-
rent definition of “aircraft” quoted above), but also would ignore a few fundamental 
aspects of current space activities and space law which would make the exercise of such 
authority by ICAO a rather different paradigm as compared to its longstanding role in 
international aviation. 
To start with, the ICAO system of “competence” hinges on communication with pilots 
to initiate flight maneuvers following the directions of an ATM authority—but piloted ves-
sels only comprise one category out of four needed to be regulated by a space traffic man-
agement system. 
For the other categories, it would be required to establish a system addressing the re-
mote control mechanisms instead. For the second category this might still work, although 
one needs to be aware again that a number of ground stations may come into play, as 
opposed to the piloted vessels which operate under the single authority of the aircraft com-
mander. 
Then again, the third category could still not be properly addressed, as this consists of 
space objects which are, by definition, nonguidable. This category, in other words, is es-
sentially beyond any “compliance.” 
As for the fourth category: it was never envisaged as an element to be regulated by 
traffic management, as the Cosmic Study would have it, but instead as an element to allow 
traffic management to become possible in the first place! The role of ICAO and its member 
states in ensuring that such radio frequency use was duly protected in the context of the 
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ITU thus also was a key element of air traffic management itself, where no comparable 
international construct exists for space traffic management. 
Furthermore, as indicated, contrary to ATM technology which is widely available across 
the world, only a handful of states currently possess the actual possibility—read technol-
ogy—to generate and properly use the information needed to order spacecraft around for 
safety purposes as part of a space traffic management system. In view of the major military 
and dual-use aspects of space activities, those few states would already have a fundamen-
tal problem with freely sharing such information—whereas on the other end, space activ-
ities by definition having a global impact, all other states may not feel comfortable with 
becoming lopsidedly dependent on such information—let alone with directive manage-
ment of their space activities and spacecraft.14 
Furthermore, in terms of the law, ICAO would not step into a vacuum. COPUOS has by 
way of the space treaties and more recently for example the COPUOS Guidelines on Space 
Debris Mitigation provided for a legal framework for space activities that, although far 
from sufficient to provide for or even deal with space traffic management, does provide 
for some important legal framework rules and principles.15 Even more pertinently, as in-
dicated, with regard to the last major element to be incorporated into any viable space 
traffic management system, the use of radio frequencies has since a number of years been 
(by and large satisfactorily so) arranged through the mechanisms available with the ITU—
which as a matter of fact also addressed the orbital slots respectively orbits the spacecraft 
using those frequencies were to occupy.16 No future space traffic management could feasi-
bly be envisaged without recognition, likely even proper integration, of these existing legal 
regimes. 
Also in the realm of competence a summary investigation of current law and key play-
ers thus shows the complexity of (and the loopholes within) the existing landscape. 
The ITU does not so much “possess a competence” to determine relevant elements of 
space traffic management in the context of frequencies and orbital positions, but rather 
represents a “gentlemen’s system of exchange of information and coordination of behavior 
for the common good”—largely dependent furthermore on national implementation by 
those with real authority to direct operators to move a space object. Would that be really 
sufficient for an all-encompassing space traffic management system, in an environment 
where more and more commercial interests interfere with the more traditional military 
and political interests? 
To begin with, this addresses essentially at best only two out of the four Cosmic Study 
categories in any comprehensive manner: radio frequencies and unpiloted vessels—the 
latter actually only to the extent completing orbits around the earth (including for this pur-
pose the geostationary orbit). 
Whereas space traffic management competence in the context of space debris boils 
down to the right to move it out of harm’s way, this essentially accrues not to any interna-
tional organization, platform or system-of-systems but to the state accountable for it in the 
first place, witness also the discussion on space debris remediation as potentially requiring 
states to allow their defunct space objects to be taken out of harm’s way by other states 
willing to do so, along the lines of the concepts of “abandonment” and “ship wrecks” in 
the law of the sea.17 
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Finally as to piloted vessels, while they also use radio frequencies, the ITU has no au-
thority whatsoever to determine where these vessels should fly, or even what messages 
the radio frequencies to be used are to transmit in that regard. That remains exclusively 
the competence of the states operating (or, in the future with private manned spaceflight, 
controlling) such vehicles. 
Even in the United States, however, the state furthest advanced in (addressing) manned 
spaceflight management, the discussion on how to exercise US jurisdiction in space inter 
alia for traffic management purposes is only just gearing up.18 
Here, it should be noted moreover that developments seem to go against any more or 
less straightforward extension of air law at least for the purposes of traffic management to 
outer space. Noting of course that we have not seen any actual such flights yet, the United 
States has chosen not to address key issues for traffic management purposes such as per-
mission to operate and use a certain trajectory as a special kind of aviation, but as a (space) 
launch activity. 
Thus, it was the 1984/1988 Commercial Space Launch Act which was amended in 2004 
to address seemingly impending private commercial sub-orbital flights.19 In the launch li-
cense due attention is given to the permitted launch trajectory, if only for the purposes of 
calculating the Maximum Probable Loss (MPL) which forms the basis of any third-party 
liability of the operator and the insurance he is obliged to take out to cover such liability.20 
US air law and ATM regulations would only come into the picture to the extent of the 
habitual temporary clearance of US airspace around the launch site. The most recent step 
here is effectively just a first step: a requirement imposed by Congress upon NASA in con-
junction with other relevant US government bodies “to study alternate frameworks for the 
management of space traffic and orbital activities.”21 
While in Europe for some time an effort (meanwhile aborted or at least put on hold) was 
made to address the future operations of at least those sub-orbital vehicles that fitted the 
definition of “aircraft,”22 this focused on the certification of such craft as per EASA,23 not 
on ATC and ATM as per Eurocontrol.24 
 
5. The issues of “delimitation” and “innocent passage” 
 
Third, whereas for air law purposes the need to determine where, vertically speaking, (sov-
ereign) airspace gives way to outer space did not really exist, for purposes of a future space 
traffic management system it seems that this would have to change. This directly relates to 
the question of “innocent passage” through foreign airspace on the way to or back from 
outer space, as this has often been posited analogously to the law of the sea.25 Is a spacecraft 
flying at altitudes of 60, 80, 100 respectively 120 km over the territory of a state different 
from where it took off already in outer space, meaning that the underlying state cannot 
claim any sovereign territorial control over that spacecraft, including subjecting it to its 
national (air) traffic management system? Or would such spacecraft still be considered as 
crossing a foreign state’s sovereign airspace, in which case the latter’s jurisdiction allows 
it to condition such flight on compliance with certain traffic management regulations or 
even completely prohibit it—unless the aforementioned “innocent passage” applies, in 
which case the underlying state presumably would still be allowed to impose traffic 
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management–related obligations, as long as not thereby effectively denying passage as 
such.26 
As sufficiently discussed elsewhere,27 the best that could be said is that as of today a 
convergence could be noted on agreement to take the 100-km altitude line as presenting 
the legal boundary between airspace and outer space, which would be ready to morph into 
customary international law if it would not be for the official resistance of the United 
States, the leading spacefaring nation of today certainly when it comes to private manned 
spaceflight, to accepting such a boundary line—or indeed, any legal boundary. 
 
6. Toward a solution? 
 
In any event, in contrast to aviation, the vast majority of space operations to be subjected 
to a future space traffic management system takes place in a global commons as opposed 
to sovereign territories. This fact alone makes the role of some kind of intergovernmental 
organization on space traffic management more crucial and indispensable still than ICAO 
for international aviation, which after all was established after several decades of interna-
tional commercial aviation had already passed by. 
Much more than in aviation, the management of traffic in outer space for the purpose 
of safe flights of manned and unmanned vehicles alike, would require a near-comprehensive 
space situational awareness system taking into consideration not only the many objects 
unmanned and difficult to maneuver but also the many objects impossible to maneuver—
yet capable of causing devastating damage to other spacecraft by impact. After all, as com-
pared to aviation, the speed of movement has become a dimension or two larger still, mak-
ing it even less likely for visual or other last-minute course corrections to remain the 
ultimate solution for avoiding accidents or serious threats thereof. Also the communication 
with those space objects that are capable thereof would largely differ from the classical 
modes of communication with aircraft, in view of most of the aforementioned ones being 
unmanned. 
Perhaps the most helpful approach is to start by recognizing that at the end of the day 
an intergovernmental authority, whether existing or newly to be established, should ap-
proach the issue of space traffic management along the lines of ATM over the high seas: 
get all states to agree within the bounds of an international regime for specific states to 
provide the services necessary in a particular part of outer space for everyone concerned 
to operate safely and efficiently—and without violating existing international law or oth-
erwise threatening the international peaceful status quo regarding outer space. 
Where this would, likely, for the foreseeable future not be a politically feasible option, 
a start could be made on the level of awareness—as is currently, to some extent, done by 
way of various space situational awareness initiatives. From such an “awareness system” 
a “competence system” should evolve along gradual lines, not necessarily immediately 
giving rise to a comprehensive globally accepted legally binding construct. 
In a first step, this could give rise to an optional adherence to such a system by a few 
leading—and farsighted—states willing to take a bow to an international regime, perhaps 
even entity, for the sake of an ultimately better and safer space environment. 
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In a second phase, such an adherence could then gradually translate into a major factor 
mitigating liabilities in particular in the context of fault liability for damage caused by one 
space object to another. Ultimately, thus the ground could be prepared for the third and 
final step: a properly binding system of space traffic management with an effective inter-
national dispute settlement mechanism. 
Depending on whether there would be such a massive increase in spaceflight (manned 
or unmanned) as to urgently require an international, comprehensive, and coherent space 
traffic management system, we might perhaps still have the time to overcome the political 
and other impediments in the way of the above suggested role of an intergovernmental 
entity, first in the realm of awareness, then in that of competence, first under an optional 
approach, then in legally binding fashion across the globe (read universe). Best, therefore, 
to start the discussion in earnest now—after all, it is even by comparison to aviation truly 
a challenge of cosmic proportions to develop a coherent, comprehensive, efficient, and ac-
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